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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS FOR POLICE
MISCONDUCT: DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION
EXIST UNDER SECTION 1983?
THEODORE.A. BRUCE*
While the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a general
trend towards limiting the availability of federal courts as a forum to liti-
gate lawsuits,' there appears no comparable trend towards limiting the
availability of a forum to litigate claims against police officers.2 For exam-
ple, in Malley v. Briggs,8 the Supreme Court recognized the viability of an
illegal arrest allegation against police officers even though they were execut-
ing an arrest warrant issued by a judge. Other federal courts have begun to
entertain lawsuits challenging standard traditional police techniques such as
roadblocks,' the use of mace, and the handcuffing of prisoners, 5 suggesting
that they could, under appropriate circumstances, establish liability.
What may be most confusing to the law enforcement community is
that this expansion of liability is in sharp contrast to a concurrent trend
towards reversing the expansion of individual defendants' rights in criminal
cases.6 In fact, some practitioners have inferred that this movement towards
expanding police liability is intentional and directly related to the effort to
limit a criminal defendant's rights. One of the historic justifications for the
"Exclusionary Rule" is that no other effective mechanism exists to discour-
* Assistant Attorney General of Missouri.
I. Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21 HARv. C.R.-
C.R. L. REV. I, 12-13 (1986); see, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (prisoner
cannot sue prison administrators for mere negligence); "Although the Warren Court seemed
inclined to broaden the traditional basis for standing, that trend has continued only in the area
of environmental law." Mahoney, The Prima Facie Section 1983 Case, 14 NAT'L L.Q. ON
LOCAL GOV'T L. 131, 142 (1982).
2. Rushing & Bratcher, Section 1983 Defenses, 14 NAT'L L.Q. ON LOCAL GOV'T L.
144 (1982).
3. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
4. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1985).
5. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (handcuffing
found reasonable under the circumstances); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1984)
(using mace on a prisoner); Justice v. Dennis, 802 F.2d 1486 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (using
mace on a drunk).
6. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160
(1987).
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age police overreaching.7 The expansion of liability for police misconduct
would negate that argument and be an important first step towards aboli-
tion of the exclusionary rule.
Law enforcement officials would argue that plaintiffs do not need en-
couragement to file lawsuits. The number of lawsuits filed in the federal
courts under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in 1985 exceeded 19,500.8 Of course,
regardless of the number of lawsuits defended, law enforcement agencies
have historically experienced an enviable record of success in litigating
these cases. In spite of, or possibly because of this success, plaintiffs have
attempted to develop new theories of recovery against police officers, pri-
marily using Section 1983 and its protection of individual constitutional and
federal rights.10
One such theory whose viability remains unresolved and uncertain at
present is an action for the infliction of "emotional distress." These are ac-
tions in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs claim no tangible physical injury,
but instead, assert that some action by a police officer caused emotional
distress.1 While the Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of award-
ing damages for mental distress or anguish,'12 the Court has not yet recog-
nized a cause of action under Section 1983 when the action challenged was
allegedly for the purpose of causing emotional distress, or was reasonably
expected to cause emotional distress.
After a brief overview of civil rights litigation in the law enforcement
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
654 (1961).
8. Priest & Whitten, Police Misconduct Suits: In Defense of Officers and Municipali-
ties, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug., 1986, at 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985) [here-
inafter § 1983] reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
9. Police agencies have a consistent record of success in defending these lawsuits, pre-
vailing in well over 90% of the lawsuits filed. Schmidt, Recent Trends in Police Tort Litiga-
tion, 8 URB. LAW. 682, 683 (1976) [hereinafter Schmidt].
10. A 600% increase in the number of lawsuits filed against law enforcement officers
has been reported. Higginbotham, Defending Law Enforcement Officers Against Personal Lia-
bility in Constitutional Tort Litigation, 54 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 24 (1985). As
little as three years ago nearly every civil rights action filed against a police officer seemed to
include a claim against his supervisor for "negligence training." This theory of liability has
been largely unsuccessful, however, because the standardization and upgrading of police train-
ing over the last several years has made such claims very difficult to substantiate. The trend
now appears to avoid such claims and plaintiffs now appear to emphasize the emotional dis-
tress claims discussed in this article.
11. See Conner v. Sticher, 801 F.2d 1266 (11th Cir. 1986).
12. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
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context, this article will review the pronouncements of the Supreme Court
on the propriety of compensation for damages for mental anguish or dis-
tress. The common-law tort for the infliction of emotional distress, a rela-
tively new development in tort law, will then be examined. Finally, the fed-
eral appellate cases that have addressed the issue of whether actions for
emotional distress are actionable will be reviewed in the context of the Su-
preme Court's Section 1983 decisions. This review should suggest that al-
though plaintiffs have heretofore been generally unsuccessful in asserting
Section 1983 claims for emotional distress, present civil rights decisions do
provide a framework for a successful suit against police officers who know-
ingly display or threaten to use force that would create severe emotional
fear and distress in the average citizen under circumstances that would, not
justify using the force threatened or displayed.
I. THE EXPANSION OF SECTION 1983
"Any analysis of the purpose and scope of Section 1983 must take cog-
nizance of the events and passions of the time at which it was enacted.""
Section 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to enforce
the amendments ratified after the Civil War, in particular the fourteenth
amendment. 4 "As introduced and enacted, it served only to ensure that an
individual had a cause of action for violations of the Constitution ... 15
With a few exceptions,1 the Civil Rights statutes were used sparingly and
were usually limited to instances of racial discrimination, typically in the
area of voting. 7
All of this changed substantially for law enforcement officers after the
Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape." That case involved a suit by
a Chicago family who alleged that thirteen police officers broke into their
home in the early morning hours with no arrest or search warrants, routed
them from their beds, rummaged through the house, and assaulted mem-
bers of the family in the course of this search.' In the majority opinion for
the Court, Justice Douglas stated that Congress intended to give a remedy
under Section 1983 to persons whose constitutional rights were violated by
13. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973).
14. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
15. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (Georgia sheriff convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for the fatal beating of a defendant shortly after his arrest); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1977).
17. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927).
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
19. Id. at 169.
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an official's "abuse of his position." 20 In a much-cited passage, Justice
Douglas stated that such a federal remedy must be available because, for
whatever reason, state law may fail to provide an adequate remedy, or a
state remedy that is available might not be enforced. 1 Subsequent decisions
have held that Section 1983 was "intended to give a broad remedy for vio-
lations of federally protected civil rights. '2
Since that decision, aggressive attempts have been made to expand
both the scope of the remedy and the persons or entities subject to liability.
Local governments and municipalities were held liable for Section 1983
damages in 197822 and subsequently lost the "good faith" defense afforded
most defendants in 1981. 2' And although liability has never been recog-
nized based upon a theory of respondeat superior under Section 1983,25 a
significant effort was made to hold administrative and supervisory personnel
liable based on theories of negligent training, negligent supervision, or neg-
ligent retention. 6 Another trend closely related to efforts to expand liability
has been to enlarge the types of acts by law enforcement officers that are
actionable as civil rights violations. As previously noted, such common po-
lice practices as roadblocks, using mace, and handcuffing prisoners have
given rise to lawsuits claiming that these acts constituted the use of exces-
sive force.2 7
An excellent example of the increasing scope of liability for police of-
ficers under Section 1983 is demonstrated in the Supreme Court's decision
in Tennessee v. Garner.2 8 In Garner, a police officer pursuing a young un-
armed burglary suspect was unable to capture the suspect on foot and, pur-
suant to Tennessee law, the common law, and departmental policy, shot the
unarmed suspect to prevent his escape.2 9 The young man's father brought a
civil rights action claiming that his son had been the victim of an unreason-
able seizure and that excessive force had been used, suing both the officer
and the Memphis Police Department." Although the common law author-
ized the use of deadly force against unarmed felony suspects to prevent
escape, and although the officer had not deviated from departmental policy
or applicable state law, the Supreme Court held that such acts were uncon-
20. Id. at 193 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 174.
22. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978).
23. Id. at 658.
24. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
25. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
26. See Schmidt, supra note 9, at 683. See also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct.
2427 (1985) (failure to train); York v. City of San Pablo, 626 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
27. See cases cited supra note 22.
28. 471 U.S. I (1985).
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 5.
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stitutional and that liability could be imposed under these circumstances.,
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Malley
v. Briggs32 that police officers executing valid warrants issued by a judge or
magistrate were not entitled to absolute immunity from suits claiming an
illegal search or seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. The officers
had argued that when the decision regarding the existence of probable
cause is made by a judge, the police officers who execute that warrant
should not be held liable for enforcing that warrant. The Court was unper-
suaded and held that the decision of the judge, though he was undoubtedly
better versed in the law than police officers, could not insulate the officers
from liability. 3
Independent of this expansion of the causes of action against police
officers, there has been a continuing effort by the Court to clarify the proof
necessary to impose liability. In Gomez v. Toledo,34 the Supreme Court
stated:
By the plain terms of Section 1983, two - and only two -
allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under
the statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has
deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the
person who has deprived him of that right has acted under color
of state or territorial law. 5
The federal courts have concluded that not every violation of state law
or every tort committed by a public official rises to the level of a constitu-
tional violation actionable under Section 1983.81 The federal courts are, af-
ter all, "courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress."" Thus, the
Supreme Court has refused to recognize all deprivations of property rights
or all injuries received as a result of actions, or refusals to act, by law en-
31. Id. at I1. A question remained whether this particular defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), since the law obviously
was not "clearly established" at the time of this incident. The Sixth Circuit has subsequently
determined that Garner will be given retroactive effect. Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 803
F.2d 217, 224 (6th Cir. 1986).
32. 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986).
33. Id. at 1098. The judge, of course, would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
34. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
35. Id. at 640.
36. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no action for defamation); Hall v. Tawney,
621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (discipline of high school student). See also Mills v. Smith,
656 F.2d 337, 340 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981), a suit against a police officer who shot an escapee,
where the court stated that "[a] negligent action resulting in personal injury does not become
a constitutional violation merely because the tortfeasor is a state or local police officer."
37. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (no "pendant party" jurisdiction);
Fritts v. Niehouse, 604 F. Supp. 823, 828 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
19871
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forcement officials as creating a cause of action under Section 1983.8 To
prevail in a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must clearly identify the consti-
tutional or federal right that is alleged to have been violated.39 As will be
discussed below, this requirement has presented the most formidable obsta-
cle to plaintiffs suing for emotional distress.
Another line of precedent that must be reviewed before any adequate
analysis of emotional distress claims can be discussed are those cases deal-
ing with the recovery of damages in civil rights claims. While not one of the
two necessary allegations set forth in Gomez, above, nearly every federal
court has made recovery under Section 1983 dependent upon the plaintiff
proving damages or injury.40 In the cases of Carey v. Piphus"' and Mem-
phis Community School Dist. v. Stachura,42 the Supreme Court clarified
the purpose of awarding damages in Section 1983 actions and the types of
damages that are recoverable in such actions. The Court stated in both
cases that a basic purpose of Section 1983 is to compensate for damages.43
In Carey, a student was suspended for smoking marijuana during
school" without any type of hearing prior to the suspension. The specific
right found to have been violated was the right to due process. No tangible
physical injury was alleged or proven, no other damages were established,
nor was there any concerted effort to argue that a hearing would have exon-
erated the student of the allegation." The question became "What is a con-
stitutional right worth in the absence of any evidence of damages?" The
Court noted that the purpose of Section 1983 and the other civil rights
statutes "is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their
contours are shaped by the interests they protect. 140 The majority of the
Court then went on to agree that mental and emotional distress alone are
compensable under Section 1983 but not "without proof that such injury
actually was caused."''4 Thus, while recovery was recognized for mental
anguish or emotional distress - even when these are the only damages
asserted - there can be no presumption that mental anguish "flowed" from
38. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668
(1986).
39. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140 (1979). Even important procedural safeguards like Miranda warnings, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as important as they may be, are "not themselves rights pro-
tected by the constitution. ... Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
40. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 92.05; Put-
nam v. Gerlof, 639 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
42. 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986).
43. Id. at 2543.
44. Cary, 435 U.S. at 249.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 264.
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the deprivation of a constitutional right."8 "In the absence of proof of actual
injury a [plaintiff] can expect to recover only nominal damages."' To re-
cover other than nominal damages the plaintiff must not only prove emo-
tional harm, but also that it was the constitutional violation that caused
those damages.50 The Court was not in a position to address the issue of
what type or quantum of proof is necessary to establish emotional distress
because the plaintiff presented no evidence relating to emotional harm and
argued that a presumption of emotional harm should exist. This presump-
tion was rejected by the Court.
In Stachura, the district court had extended the notion of nominal
damages by instructing the jury that they could award a sum to compensate
for the violation of a constitutional right apart from, and in addition to, any
other compensatory damages the jury might award. 1 Stachura was a ten-
ured school teacher who was suspended with pay by the school board be-
cause of his use of certain sex education material in his classroom. 2 The
teacher was subsequently reinstated and lost no salary. Nevertheless, he
brought suit under Section 1983 claiming violations of due process and of
his first amendment right to academic freedom.53 The Supreme Court again
recognized the propriety of recovery for personal humiliation, mental
anguish or emotional distress,8 but disapproved of the district court's in-
struction to the jury that they could award damages for compensation and
for a constitutional violation. 5 Damage awards under Section 1983 are es-
sentially no different than damages in any tort case where the purpose of
the damage award is to "compensate for the injury caused to the plaintiff
by the defendant's breach of duty." 6
The Supreme Court's willingness to compensate for mental anguish or
emotional distress is not, however, the equivalent to recognizing a separate
and distinct claim for emotional distress. Nevertheless, the Court has
clearly demonstrated its willingness to acknowledge developments in the
common law58 and incorporate those developments into Section 1983 juris-
48. Id. at 263.
49. Id. at 248.
50. Id. at 263.
51. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (1986).
52. Id. at 2540.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2542-43.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Supreme Court's ab-
rogation of the right of police officers to use deadly force against a fleeing felon was based, in
part, upon the fact that "the long-term movement has been away from the rule that deadly
force may be used against any fleeing felon, and that remains the rule in less than half the
states." Id. at 18.
19871
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prudence. One of the recent developments in the common law has been the
recognition of actions for the infliction of emotional distress.
II. THE TORT FOR INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Originally, objections to common law actions for the infliction of emo-
tional distress included concerns over the difficulty in proving and measur-
ing recoverable damages, as well as the obvious potential for fictitious suits
brought for inappropriate reasons.58 "Nevertheless, the trend in recent
years has been to permit recovery for mental distress alone." 59 Tort law has
placed a distinction of considerable importance between the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The importance of this distinction in the context of Section 1983 cases is
uncertain, however, since the Supreme Court has not set forth any particu-
lar state of mind requirement before imposing liability and has found noth-
ing in the legislative history that "limits the statute solely to intentional
deprivations of constitutional rights. . . ."" It is nevertheless worth noting
that the courts have historically been more willing to extend the common
law tort of inflicting emotional distress to "intentional acts of a flagrant
character."'"
The leading case in the development of this cause of action is Dillon v.
Legg,62 in which the California Supreme Court developed the "negligence
theory" of liability for inflicting emotional distress. A more recent theory of
recovery, now used by a majority of the courts recognizing this tort, is the
"zone-of-danger" theory of recovery.63 Applied most often in cases where
the plaintiff has witnessed injury to another, the "zone of danger" theory
58. Campbell, The Emotional Trauma of Hijacking: Who Pays?, 74 KENTUCKY L.J.
599 (1986); "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598,
11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861).
59. Campbell, supra note 58. For an overview of the state restrictions imposed on state
court actions for emotional distress to assure the genuineness of the claims, see Note, Murder
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 1986 DUKE L.J. 572, 580-81
(1986).
60. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981). In fact, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the Supreme Court held that an act by a public official that does not
violate "clearly established" law is not subject to liability. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S.
Ct. 2806 (1985). On the other hand, the officer's "pure heart" is not a sufficient defense if his
actions were unreasonable when viewed objectively. Id.
61. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §
12, at 57 (5th ed. 1984).
62. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
63. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357,
361 (1984). For a more detailed explanation and criticism of this "zone-of-danger" analysis,
see Note, Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital: A Contribution to the Inadequacy of Law Allowing
for Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages, 12 J. COMTEMP. L. 289 (1987).
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limits recovery to plaintiffs who have been placed in fear of bodily harm
themselves by some act of the defendant." Thus, while the damages may be
for having viewed injury to another person, the action will lie only when the
defendant took some action that also amounted to a breach of duty to the
plaintiff as well. "It is premised on the traditional negligence concept that
by unreasonably endangering the plaintiff's physical safety the defendant
has breached a duty owed to him or her for which he or she should recover
all damages sustained." ' 5
Crucial to the acceptance of this cause of action is the ability of the
plaintiffs to specify to the courts the personal interest to be protected.6' For
this reason some states have required the emotional distress to have been
brought about by witnessing actual harm to a family member.6" In Ramirez
v. Armstrong, the New Mexico Supreme Court required a family relation-
ship to exist between the plaintiff and the victim before recovery would be
permitted." That court also required some physical manifestation of the
emotional harm to be proven.6 In addition, the majority of courts require
the emotional trauma to be severe and verifiable,70 although some jurisdic-
tions have no such limitation."
In Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,7" the Hawaii Supreme
Court allowed a family to recover for emotional distress allegedly occurring
when the family dog, Prince, died of heat prostration at a quarantine sta-
tion.7" None of the plaintiffs witnessed the death nor did any of them seek
or receive any medical or psychological assistance.7 ' The Hawaii Supreme
Court recognized valid emotional distress claims in situations where a "rea-
sonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."'7 6
While the affirmation of a verdict in this case may be somewhat "surpris-
ing," the court's definition of emotional distress does seem rational and ac-
ceptable. This case is indicative of the trend towards broadening the ability
of plaintiffs to recover for purely emotional harm. Given this climate, at-
64. Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983).
67. Id.
68. Id. This case involved children who saw their father struck and killed by an auto-
mobile while he was attempting to cross the street.
69. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
70. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 231, 461 N.E.2d, 843, 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357,
363 (1984).
71. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980).
72. 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981).
73. Id. at 558, 632 P.2d at 1067.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 560, 632 P.2d at 1068.
1987]
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tempts to recover under Section 1983 were inevitable.
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, POLICE MISCONDUCT, AND SECTION 1983
No reported cases currently exist where recovery for a claim of emo-
tional distress has been recognized and an award of damages sustained. 76
Reported federal cases have, however, addressed the possibility of these
claims and have, in a few instances, held that a cause of action exists. One
of the earliest reported cases is White v. Rochford,7 a Seventh Circuit
opinion by a three judge panel that included a concurring opinion and a
dissent. The allegations were that the Chicago police arrested a driver for
drag racing on a busy eight-lane highway and left three young children in
the abandoned car along the highway despite pleas to either take the chil-
dren to the police station or to help them contact their parents.78 The com-
plaint, filed by the children, alleged that as a result the children suffered
"'mental pain and anguish. ' 79 Upon appeal from the district court's dismis-
sal, the majority opinion for the panel held that "such conduct indisputably
breaches the Due Process Clause." 80 The opinion stated that chief among
the "liberty interests" protected by the Due Process Clause is the right "to
some degree of bodily integrity.181 Due process could also be violated when-
ever any state action occurs which "shocks the conscience."8 Under this
due process analysis of the majority opinion, the violation of due process
caused the emotional distress and was actionable.83
The concurring opinion also believed the cause was actionable, but for
a different reason." The constitutional "right" recognized by the concur-
ring judge was a "federally protected right to be free from unjustified intru-
sions on their personal security by the police." 8' Though unspecified by the
concurrence, the "intrusion" apparently emanated from the arrest of the
driver,86 making it appear that the constitutional right related to the fourth
76. The author has, however, defended several cases in which claims for emotional dis-
tress arising from various acts by police officers have been alleged. Discussions with colleagues
have revealed similar experiences, thus indicating that district courts are willing to recognize
these claims, although the constitutional bases for these claims are often not clearly pleaded.
77. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
78. Since the case had been dismissed by the district court based on the pleadings, the
truth of these allegations, or the extent to which the facts were challenged by the defendants,
are unknown.
79. White, 592 F.2d at 382.
80. Id. at 383.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 385.
83. Id. at 386.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 387.
86. Id. at 388.
[Vol. 22
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/3
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER § 1983
amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures. According to the concur-
rence, once the arrest had taken place the officers had a duty to see that the
children had some protection. In fact, later interpretations of this case by
the Seventh Circuit have held the case to stand for the proposition that "the
Constitution creates a duty on the part of police officers to protect minor
children from immediate hazards after police officers arrest the children's
guardian. . . .,87 Whether sound constitutional policy or not, these subse-
quent holdings, coupled with the inability of the White panel to reach a
consensus, certainly limit the principles enunciated by the majority opinion
and limit the applicability of this case to "emotional distress" claims. The
dissenting opinion in White questioned whether the plaintiffs were able to
specify any constitutional right that was violated, disagreed with the major-
ity's due process analysis, and concluded that no constitutional right was
implicated in the police action."
As just noted, with three different opinions and three different conclu-
sions, White's precedential value is limited at best.89 The subsequent deci-
sions of the Seventh Circuit have given the White opinion a very narrow
interpretation that substantially limits the availability of White as support
for an emotional distress claim.90 Nevertheless, White is worthy of discus-
sion, not so much for what it held, but because of the various interpreta-
tions subsequent courts from other circuits have given the case.91
One subsequent Seventh Circuit case decided by a different three
member panel does, however, merit discussion because of the well-reasoned
analysis by a consensus suggesting that a claim for emotional distress may
be cognizable. In Gumz v. Morrissette,9 a "muck farmer" 93 who was in-
volved in an ongoing dispute with state conservation officers over his muck
farm operation, sued the officials for his arrest that involved a high-speed
chase by ten officers armed with pistols, shotguns, and rifles94 - all to se-
cure payment of a $100 civil penalty. The plaintiff sued for $2.4 million
87. Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
88. White, 592 F.2d at 390.
89. Justice Blackmun, however, cited the case with approval in his dissent in Davidson
v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 674 n.3 (1986).
90. Ellsworth, 744 F.2d at 185.
91. In particular, a claim for the denial of a due process claim under § 1983 was dis-
missed by the Seventh Circuit when a social service agency failed to intervene when given
substantial information regarding child abuse that ultimately resulted in brain damage to that
child. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
Though finding the agency "blameworthy," the court nevertheless could find no deprivation of
any liberty interest, casting further doubt upon the "duty" analysis implied in White.
92. 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985).
93. This is apparently a farmer who uses sludge or "muck" he gathers from waterways
to fertilize or otherwise grow his crops. Id. at 1397.
94. Id. at 1398.
95. Id. at 1400.
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although he was not pushed, struck, or threatened, and suffered no physical
injuries whatsoever as a result of the incident.' The jury had found the
officers liable and through a special verdict found the injury to be the emo-
tional distress from the arrest and its immediate aftermath.97 The Seventh
Circuit's duty was to determine "whether the use of force was so egregious
as to be constitutionally excessive ... .
The majority undertook its analysis under the fourteenth amendment
as a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process of law.99 This anal-
ysis is used by a majority of the federal circuits in reviewing "excessive
force" cases.100 The claim is grounded on the due process principle that it is
impermissible to "punish" a suspect until the suspect has been convicted of
a crime. Excessive or unreasonable force is, therefore, "punishment" with-
out due process of law.101 In this case, the only force used "was the grossly
excessive demonstration of manpower and firepower. '12
The standard for the finding that excessive force was used under the
fourteenth amendment analysis requires proof that the force:
1) caused severe injuries,
2) was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the
circumstances (i.e., unreasonably), and
3) was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise
excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official
power that shocks the conscience.0
While the court did find sufficient evidence of malice and that the
"draconian" use of force was excessive, the court concluded that "this case
does not involve the type of severe harm redressable under Section
19 8 3 ."111 The court noted that no case had yet allowed recovery under a
Section 1983 excessive force claim in the absence of a physical injury. 10 '
The majority also believed that a finding of liability under Section 1983 for
an excessive force claim based on the demonstration of force would be
"most unusual." 100 The court did recognize, however, that it is possible that
an "extreme emotional response," with or without physical manifestations,
96. Id. at 1401.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1399.
100. Id. at 1404 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1405.
102. Id. at 1401.
103. Id. at 1400.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1401.
106. Id.
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could be a "severe injury" that could result in liability.107
In his concurring opinion, Judge Easterbrook agreed with the major-
ity's judgment, but makes a persuasive argument that this case, and all
excessive force cases against police officers, should be analyzed under the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.108 Judge
Easterbrook asserts three reasons for this belief: First, the only excessive
force analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court has been under the fourth
amendment, most notably Tennessee v. Garner; second, the fourth amend-
ment is alone in directly addressing police seizures; and third, a fourth
amendment analysis uses an objective standard of reasonableness, which
avoids difficult issues regarding the defendant's intentions.109 The concur-
rence suggests that a "shock the conscience" standard is too difficult to de-
fine and gives a police officer no guidance in determining the propriety of
his or her conduct.110 The concurrence concludes by suggesting that "to-
morrow's cases should be assessed exclusively under the standards of the
fourth amendment.""'
In two subsequent cases the analysis of the constitutional rights in-
volved is neither as detailed nor as definite. In Checki v. Webb,"" the plain-
tiffs claimed that they were "alarmed" by police officers who were tailgat-
ing the plaintiffs' vehicle at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour.'13 After a
twenty mile chase the plaintiffs' vehicle was stopped at a roadblock." 4 Af-
ter dismissal of the suit by the district court for procedural reasons, " 5 the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial. The court stated the
officers' actions "crossed the constitutional line that would make their pur-
suit and harassment actionable under Section 1983.""' The opinion does
not,.however, attempt to be anymore definite as to the constitutional right
allegedly violated. Instead, the court simply states that while the negligent
use of a vehicle is not actionable under Section 1983,'17 the "intentional
misuse" of a vehicle is actionable. " 8 The court then concludes that there is
no reason why physical injury should be required to prevail under Section
107. Id. at 1402.
108. Id. at 1404.
109. Id. at 1404, 1407.
110. Id. at 1407.
Ill. Id. at 1409.
112. 785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 535.
114. Id. at 536.
115. The district court dismissed the claim for both improper venue and for exceeding
the statute of limitations. Id. at 538. Before addressing the substance of the claim, the appel-
late court overruled the district court's determination of both issues and remanded the case. Id.
116. Id. at 538.
117. Id. (citing Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 948 (11th Cir. 1986)).
118. Checki, 785 F.2d at 538.
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1983.1 In dicta that will undoubtedly be quoted in future emotional dis-
tress actions, the court concludes: "A police officer who terrorizes a civilian
by brandishing a cocked gun in front of that civilian's face may not cause
physical injury, but he has certainly laid the building blocks for a Section
1983 claim against him."1 2 0
In Connor v. Sticher,'2 1 the defending police officers told a witness in a
murder case that the murder suspect might try to kill him or harm his
family; the police knew this information was untrue but related the lie as
part of an "unusual" police investigation to catch the criminal defendant. 2 2
The plaintiffs sued under Section 1983 claiming that they lived in "constant
fear for their lives."11 2'  The Eleventh Circuit properly noted that it must
first find a deprivation of a constitutional right. 2 4 It then analyzed the
claims under the fourteenth amendment and found no liberty interest in-
volved. 25 The court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the plaintiffs were
never in any physical danger and distinguished Checki and White based on
the belief that both of those cases involved the potential risk of actual phys-
ical harm. 2 ' A dissenting opinion expressed the belief that "psychological
harassment by police" was a danger to society and that individuals have a
constitutionally protected interest in being free from police activity of this
nature.12 7 The opinion does not, however, cite any case or authority for the
proposition that being free from police harassment, per se, is a constitu-
tional right; the only citation in the opinion is to George Orwell's 1984.28
IV. DiscussiON
The eagerness of some of the courts in the above cases to provide a
remedy for what those courts perceive as police misconduct can be easily
inferred from the opinions. Dislike of police actions is not, however, a suffi-
cient substitute of the need to clearly articulate the legal basis for imposing
liability under Section 1983, particularly given the limited scope of that
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 801 F.2d 1266 (1lth Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 1267.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1268.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1269.
128. Id. In some states, the appellate courts have developed a rule of exclusion in crimi-
nal cases in which instances of outrageous police misconduct will not just cause exclusion of
certain evidence, but will result in the dismissal of the criminal charges against the defendant.
See, e.g., State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. App. 1982). This rule is not, however,
intended as a procedural mechanism to protect individual constitutional rights but is specifi-
cally directed towards inhibiting certain types of police activity.
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statute1 2 9 and the limited jurisdiction given federal courts. °30 The inability
to be any more descriptive than "freedom from police harassment" or "in-
trusions upon personal integrity" demonstrates a substantial shortcoming in
the heretofore reported cases addressing claims for emotional distress. The
shortcoming is not in the ability to plead or prove emotional harm but is
instead the inability to establish that the emotional harm was the result of
the denial of, or interference with, a specified constitutional right.
Physical injury need not be proven for damages to be established, al-
though the plaintiff must still prove his damages - emotional or otherwise
- with evidence at trial.' 3 ' Proof -of injury does not provide a substantial
impediment to recovery in valid causes of actions where emotional trauma
is evident and would be likely to occur in any average citizen confronted
with the situation giving rise to suit. The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
syndrome, originally evidenced in combat veterans, is now widely recog-
nized as a verifiable emotional response to stress with specific, objectively
verifiable symptoms.1'3 The disorder is thought to be brought about by a
"stressor," defined as a traumatic event or incident that is likely to cause
emotional distress in most people.' 3 Examples are surviving a natural dis-
aster, being hijacked, or witnessing a tragic death. Such a diagnostic tool
fits well with the requirement in many states that recognize the tort of emo-
tional distress but limit the action to unusual occurrences that are likely to
cause severe and verifiable shock.' 3 4 Requiring some action on the part of a
police defendant that is beyond the normal procedures commonly used by
law enforcement, and beyond what the typical citizen would expect to be
confronted with, would not only be consistent with the trend in tort law, but
129. "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitu-
tion, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 146 (1979).
130. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
131. See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986).
132. Ettedgui & Bridges, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF
NORTH AMERICA 89 (1985); Green, Lindy, & Grace, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: To-
ward DSM-IV, 173 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 406 (1985).
133. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3rd ed. 1980) (also known as DSM-ll1).
134. See, e.g., Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357
(1984) (the emotional distress must be serious and verifiable); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100
N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983) (the emotional injury must be from witnessing an accident
resulting in serious physical injury or death to the victim).
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
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would also avoid the Supreme Court's fear that Section 1983 will be turned
into a general tort remedy.13
More important, such a requirement is compatible with the "reasona-
bleness" standard under the fourth amendment and is more conducive to
objective review. The questions would be: "Was the officer's conduct unrea-
sonable in light of the facts he knew or should have known?" and "Is one of
the facts he should have known that his actions were likely to cause sub-
stantial emotional trauma to an ordinary person?" While having a gun
aimed or fired in one's direction is likely to cause emotional trauma in any-
one, that will not be the end of the inquiry; the officer who commits such an
act may nevertheless be acting reasonably if the potential plaintiff is a mur-
der suspect. Such actions may not be reasonable when dealing with a mo-
torist whose only offense has been to exceed the posted speed limit by five
miles per hour.
Given the Supreme Court's recognition of damages for emotional dis-
tress and the mental health profession's ability to diagnose trauma, the na-
ture of the damages in a claim for emotional distress do not present an
insurmountable burden for a plaintiff. For example, in Duncan v. Nelson, 
1 3
the Seventh Circuit found that police officers could be held liable for a fifth
amendment violation by coercing a confession.1 3 7 The plaintiff was not
physically touched, but alleged that he was nevertheless psychologically co-
erced.1 3 8 This Section 1983 action was cognizable because of the plaintiff's
ability to identify his damages (the consequences of his coerced confession)
and to clearly articulate a constitutional right that was violated.1 9 In con-
trast, the plaintiff in Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina School Dist.,1"
was not entitled to retain her jury award for emotional distress arising from
a first amendment violation because she presented no evidence to substanti-
ate her claim for emotional damages. 4
It should be emphasized that no attempt is made to suggest that evi-
dence of post-traumatic stress syndrome would be necessary to establish a
claim for emotional distress. This syndrome is simply noted as an example
of how medical science is able to detect and classify emotional problems. 4"
135. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
136. 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
137. Id. at 944.
138. Id. at 945.
139. See also Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986), where the
victim of reverse discrimination received $150,000 for mental anguish which was upheld by the
appellate court because the damages were supported by the evidence. Id. at 1146.
140. 806 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 1201.
142. In Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986), the court held that
the proof of emotional trauma necessary for recovery was not required to be equivalent to the
proof necessary in a state court claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[Vol. 22
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss1/3
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UNDER § 1983
With the trend towards relaxing the admissibility standards for expert wit-
nesses,14 3 no justification exists for failing to present evidence to substanti-
ate a valid claim for emotional distress. While it is true that the possibility
exits that bogus claims for emotional trauma could be made, " , the possibil-
ity seems no greater than those for the ubiquitous back injuries in personal
injury cases.14' This article does advocate, however, the position that like
the "stressors" causing a post traumatic stress reaction, the action of the
police officers giving rise to a Section 1983 cause of action for emotional
distress should be actions that could reasonably be expected to cause a se-
vere emotional reaction in the average citizen.
From the review of the federal cases addressing the issue, it appears
obvious that the identification of a specific civil right remains the critical
obligation of any plaintiff who desires to succeed in any claim for emotional
distress. As stated by Judge Easterbrook in Gumz, the fourth amendment
seems to provide the best and most logical basis for imposing liability upon
police officers in an appropriate situation. 6 There may be situations in
which police actions cause emotional distress as a result of violating some
other constitutional right. The burning of a cross on a black citizen's lawn
would undoubtedly cause emotional distress and would clearly establish a
fourteenth amendment equal protection violation. Likewise, harassment be-
cause of an individual's expression of an unpopular opinion could establish
a first amendment violation."" The fourth amendment, however, is directed
towards police activity and explicitly prohibits both unreasonable seizures
and unreasonable searches. A display of force of a magnitude that seems
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances might, in fact, be an "un-
reasonable seizure" because it was excessive. Both Gumz and Checki hint
at this possibility. A claim under the fourteenth amendment analysis under
143. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3rd Cir. 1981). See also Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1965);
Lewis, Trying a Trauma Case, TRIAL, April, 1985, at 52. But see J. ZISKIN, I COPING WITH
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 4 (3rd ed. 1981); Weinstein, Improving Expert
Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 477-82 (1986); McCord, Expert Psychological Testi-
mony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibil-
ity of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 24-33 (1986).
144. Marcus, Malingering or Mental Distress, 35 DEF. L.J. 705 (1986).
145. See Brena & Turk, Chronic Pain and Disability: An Overview for Legal Profes-
sionals, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 122, 123 (1987).
146. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404 (7th Cir. 1985); Bacharach, Section
1983 and the Availability of a Federal Forum: A Reappraisal of the Police Brutality Cases,
16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 353, 367 (1986).
147. See Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina School Dist., 806 F.2d at 1202 (teacher
had a first amendment claim for emotional distress due to transfer in retaliation for expressing
her opinions). But contrast this situation with the finding of "harassment" in Checki v. Webb,
785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1986), where the court was not able to articulate the constitutional
right violated by this harassment.
1987]
Bruce: Emotional Distress Claims for Police Misconduct:  Does a Cause of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
78 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a similar fact situation would be tenuous at best since it is difficult to estab-
lish "punishment" when no physical activity was involved.
In Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 48 an inmate sued
his arresting officers for using excessive force to effect his arrest for a nar-
cotics violation.' 4 9 During the execution of a search warrant for plaintiff's
residence, one officer allegedly arrived at plaintiff's bedroom door with her
gun pointed and said "Don't move, police.' 150 The Fourth Circuit held that
"this action, entirely proper in itself, will not support an action for a tort of
constitutional magnitude," and specifically held that drawing a gun while
conducting a search for narcotics was not improper.'51 In other words, the
action of the officer under these circumstances was reasonable.
Different facts, however, might justify a different conclusion. As al-
ready suggested, drawing a gun for a speeding infraction might be the type
of action expected to cause emotional distress for most motorists and might
not be a reasonable seizure. Forcing that same motorist to the ground might
also be excessive and unreasonable. Of course, these are both valid police
techniques that are appropriate in certain situations. The possibility never-
theless exists that the demonstration of excessive force in inappropriate situ-
ations likely to cause distress in most people could give rise to a civil rights
action under Section 1983 for a fourth amendment violation. The essence,
after all, of an excessive force claim is weighing the amount of force used
against the need for its application.1 2
It is no revelation to state that many civil rights claims are frivolous or
marginal at best, 58 and this article is not intended to encourage the filing
of bogus actions.' T Nevertheless, a claim for emotional distress under Sec-
tion 1983 as a result of police misconduct does lie upon a proper set of
facts. In pleading these claims the better practice, for both the court and
148. 762 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 789 (1986).
149. Id. at 32.
150. Id. at 33.
151. Id.
152. King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980). "[N]o court has yet found un-
reasonable force that was necessary to effect an arrest." 2 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 23.7 (2d ed. 1984). Some courts have also held that the nature
of the misconduct relates directly to the type of injuries that can be expected as a result of that
conduct. "Extreme and outrageous conduct by its nature produces distress in 'normally consti-
tuted' persons against whom it is directed." Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 319, 428
A.2d 966, 970 (1981).
153. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (1987).
154. The author's most vivid experience was in dealing with a lawsuit by an inmate in a
state prison who made a § 1983 claim, for among numerous other things, that he had incurred
$200,000 damages for psychological harm because he had received his Christmas card from
his sister two weeks late. White v. Bond, 720 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1983) (For whatever reason,
the specifics of this particular complaint were not discussed in the opinion).
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the parties, appears to be, to assert and then to prove the unreasonableness
of the conduct from an objective viewpoint. This protects the plaintiff from
unreasonable and excessive acts, while also affording police officers some
guidelines in performing their duties."' The due process analysis advocated
by some courts presents substantial difficulties for all parties, not merely
because this analysis has not actually been accepted by the Supreme Court,
but because under the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'56
the conduct of a police officer, or any other public official, is to be viewed
objectively for purposes of determining qualified immunity."' 7 In Harlow,
the Supreme Court "rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a
wholly objective standard."' 58 Thus, even mistakes in judgment by a police
officer will not result in liability unless the actions violated a "clearly estab-
lished" standard.15 9
Most important, the reasonableness standard requires a focus on the
specific constitutional right violated. To this extent the cases denying relief
for emotional distress claims offer more guidance for trial courts and liti-
gants because they articulate the shortcomings for the claims, i.e., the lack
of a specified constitutional violation. To be candid, the courts finding a
cause of action appear so eager to rectify what they perceive to be an injus-
tice that they fail to either articulate the constitutional right violated or the
standard for determining liability; the opinions make only vague references
to the various "liberty interests" with no detectible guidelines for the lower
courts to follow in litigating these claims. These cases do demonstrate, how-
ever, that the federal courts are receptive to a claim for emotional distress
under Section 1983 and the Supreme Court's recent decisions leave little
doubt that a well-plead, factually based claim which: 1) succinctly identifies
the constitutional right violated by the actions of a police officer, 2) demon-
strates that a reasonable person should know that the actions were likely to
cause emotional anguish or distress, 3) demonstrates that the actions were
objectively unreasonable, and 4) provides tangible evidence of emotional
distress, is cognizable under Section 1983. Just as state tort actions for
emotional distress are rare in relation to the number of physical injury ac-
tions, the number of civil rights-actions for emotional distress will undoubt-
edly be few. Incorporating the common law requirement that the claims be
155. "[A]n officer told to do nothing that 'shocks the conscience' of six people to be
drawn out of a jury wheel some years hence would have considerable difficulty knowing how to
behave." Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d at 1395, 1404 (7th Cir. 1985).
156. 457 U.S.800 (1982).
157. Id. at 818.
158. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984).
159. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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limited to actions where the emotional distress is severe or substantial will
assure that such claims do not become too numerous or frivolous.16 °
160. Once again, this will also keep these types of actions in conformity with the general
policy that exists in state courts that recognizes emotional distress claims. "The law intervenes
only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
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